Three What? Augustine and the Trinity (Part II)

II. Being and Relationship

After articulating the necessity of substantive terms of God (rather than accidental ones), Augustine attempts to authentically “speak” the threeness of God. For him, persona, and its Greek counterpart hypostasis, are primarily substance words, and thus can be predicated commonly. The fact that person is common to Father, Son, and Spirit means a problematic relationship of genus-species-individual that ends up in the same status as “being” and predications ad se (which are common as cum altero), and which would terminate in either “one being-one person” or “three persons-three beings.” Person, as an ontological category, cannot escape the interplay of genus and species that mark the predication of being, and thus cannot serve to properly signify that which is three (triad). For Augustine then, that which distinguishes Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can only be relationship. He denies that distinction between persons can derive from either the economic purpose a person has for creation or in terms of divine attributes (which are common predications). Thus, intra-divine relationship can be the only possible ground. Yet relationship cannot seemingly be expressed in ontological terms, since this always seems to lead to what Edmund Hill has called “the tangle of species and genus” and unacceptable conclusions to the equation of one being or God with one person, or three persons with three beings; or, in other words, the problematic duality between unity and diversity.[1] Thus, in the end, “person” comes to rise as a term drawn from convention, elected simply to stand as an answer to the question: “Three what?”[2]

Already what is hinted at by this question is the ambiguous (but not hostile) place that relationship has with respect to being or ontology. It is neither substance nor accident, nor genus nor species, yet nor is it nothing. It is clear that for Augustine the language of being is consumed with these categories that stress substance, and thus are employed in such a way as to secure the absolute equality in God. But ontological language for that reason fails to do justice to the mysterious diversity of the Trinity that relationship secures. Despite our language concerning being and its employment with regard to divine unity, conceptually we grasp that trinity is there: the action of God in the economy of salvation reveals three “somethings;” “God is the three,” and thus beyond what our finite conception and articulation can achieve concerning God’s being, there must be some reconciliation between God’s unity and His diversity in God’s simplicity. Thus, God’ being as unity ultimately, in its simplicity, signifies a unity that must exceed a finite conception of unity according to which, for us, relationship and commonality are irreconcilable in terms of God’s being.

Relationship terms do mark off what is distinct in the Godhead (the Father is not the Son, etc.). And thus, according to relationship, we have the precise sense in which such predications need not be taken cum altero: not “with the other.” And yet, there is another sense in which all relationship predications must be “taken with” terms predicated commonly.

By this we do not mean to confuse the distinction between, say, the Son and wisdom (that, as Augustine fears, would lead to unacceptable consequences about the Father’s or the Spirit’s wisdom). Rather, it seems that Augustine’s position is one that holds a complex and tensile union between the diversity (in relationship) and unity (in being); which is to say that Augustine wants us neither to conflate the predications, but more importantly not to interpret the uniqueness of any person in such a way as to exclude absolutely this sense of reconciliation between diversity and unity. Neither is ultimately reducible to the other, and if we can speak the being and unity of God and His attributes with some clarity, it remains such that “persons” are expressed even more adequately as “somethings.” Any attempt to interpret either unity or diversity as “primary” or reducible to the other will lead only to a false image of the Christian God: either “one person-one God,” found in Arian and Sabellian forms (the former denying the diversity in substance that would secure the Son’s divinity; the latter restricting all diversity to functionality or mode in history); or “three persons-three Gods,” as found in tri-theism.

Thus, if contemporary theologians are to charge that Augustine takes divine unity as primary and foundational for any sense of distinction, this can only be the case in a sense that does not exclude or reduce diversity to nothing; in a sense that takes the unity with diversity[3]. And this tensile unity between oneness and threeness is due to God’s simplicity. From our point of view, interestingly enough, God’s simplicity is anything but simple! For Augustine, following the Cappadocians, simplicity is identified with immutability: accidents are only found in changeable creatures, and all the attributes of God must be of a substantial nature and are thus identified with each other. It is then not different for God “to be good” and “to be wise.” And yet, somehow this account of simplicity is consistent with the fact that for God “to be Son” and “to be good” are not entirely the same: it is one thing for God to be wise, which is predicated according to divine being; and it is “another” thing for God to be Son, which is secured with reference to relationship.

How is it then that divine simplicity is consistent with such distinction? It just so happens that it is because of simplicity that there is absolute unity in God and distinction between persons: both derive from simplicity. In the first instance, if we attribute, say, wisdom to the Son and love to the Spirit, it remains the fact that in God being wise and loving are not different things: neither is more or greater; they are identical because He is simple. Thus, because they are equated by God’s simple being, how can the Son withhold wisdom from the Spirit, or how can the Spirit withhold love from the Son? All substantive predications, because they are all absolutely identified with each other, simultaneously identify the persons they are predicated of (in substance).

On the other hand relationship, which has ontological value in the sense that it is mysteriously “in between” accident and substance, only has its ability to distinguish the persons because of its situation in the divine unity, or rather, simplicity: in creatures, relationships are situated in the realm of accidents, because we are composite and the relations inhere in us, such that our “to be” and “to be a father” are not identical. However, in God, because He is altogether simple, accidents are accorded no space, and thus relationality finds a new home in God’s Being that is, though not accidental, nonetheless irreducible to mere substance. This unique distance between relationship and substantive attribution in God is actually secured by His divine simplicity, and thus His absolute unity. Were God to be less than simple, relations would fall to the place of accidents and thus the personal distinctions in God would be reducible; the common essence would endure, while any sense of personality would be subject to change and thus of an entirely weaker ontological significance. One must take note of the distinction between the richer and deeper unity in simplicity, that actually co-implicates God’s threeness; and the weaker sense of unity, in which the common being of God actually does govern, limit, and evacuate the relationality in God of its lasting meaning. Paradoxical as it seems: one is forced to read in this a sense of simplicity and unity that actually saves the true sense of diversity in God, rather than evacuating it of its significance.

Overall, one can see in this account both a sense of unity in God’s being and diversity in His relationships that exceed common notions of unity and distinction. There is, for lack of a better phrase, a sense of unity beyond unity: the unity of the divine being that is reached by the unaided understanding, can only end in an account in which unity limits and rules over diversity (Arianism, Sabellianism, etc.); as well as a sense of threeness beyond threeness: the distinctions encountered in the economy, without the complementary work of the understanding that stresses unity, will either result in a form of subordinationism or tri-theism. Thus it would seem that God’s simplicity, which accounts for the reconciliation in Him between distinct persons in relation and common being, can only be attested to complexly by finite and changeable creatures.[4] God’s simplicity is seen in the co-implication of unity and relationships in His Being, and we can only weakly treat these as irreducible elements of God, never so “simple” as to be fully understood. Faith in a triune God whose simplicity is beyond finitude determines the limitations of the understanding that follows it. And thus, here, one sees “faith seeking understanding” at work.

III: Appropriations and Economy

However, it may seem that relationship, which for Augustine is the sole ground of specificity and uniqueness of persons, may actually exclude any importance with regard to the economic taxis and the specificity of missions or appropriations. It is one thing to argue about the complicated relationship between unity and diversity within God, and the potential for one to lord over the other; it is a different criticism that, even lending such a complex understanding of unity and distinction within God, it seems this solely intra-divine ground of specificity robs it of any place in salvation history: because neither missions nor substantial appropriations can be the ground of distinction between persons, and if relationship (which is that ground) is seemingly at odds with, distant from, or even usurped by the divine unity, then the diversity as it functions in the economy is seemingly destroyed or rendered meaningless, rather than upheld by its grounding in the being of God.

Appropriations occur according to convention, because all non-relational terms are predicated commonly, and thus for us to refer such a term to just one of the divine persons is without precedent. A parallel example of this reasoning concerns the missions of the persons, particularly that of the Son in becoming Incarnate. For Lacugna, Augustine’s preference for the divine unity in actions ad extra actually undermines any significance that the Son has (as Son) in relation to us. Because appropriation of substantial terms is of the common substance, and because actions ad extra are one, what criterion is left to determine why it is that the Son and only the Son becomes Incarnate, and less crucially, is called Wisdom above all? Yet this seemingly arbitrary sense of convention by which we predicate wisdom of the Son specifically, even though the Father is wisdom and the Spirit too is wisdom, is actually enriched by the sense of the “convenience” of such appropriation. By “convenience” I refer to what St. Thomas calls, reverberating Augustine, the “outstanding suitability” and “natural kinship” that the Son has with respect to the appropriation of wisdom and becoming incarnate as Savior.[5]

The key to the Son’s appropriation as Wisdom is His intra-divine status as perfect Image of the Father, (“image” being, as St. Thomas notes following Augustine, a term that Scripture applies both to the Son and to men) and the Son’s “suitability” for becoming incarnate is thanks to “kinship” with creation: creation occurs through the Son as the Word of God. Thus, the appropriation as “convention” stands in a unique place. It is neither totally arbitrary nor necessary that the Son be called wisdom and become incarnate, and there is still a strong sense in which “wisdom” and the mission of “salvation” are substantial terms that tell us nothing definitive about the Son in distinction from the other persons. And yet, it is not the case that such appropriations tell us entirely nothing, because in each case the predications are grounded in the Sons intra-divine relations. They are not totally arbitrary because here the Son’s relationship comes to have meaning for us and our understanding of the Trinity, in such a way that is not reducible to, nor opposed to, the metaphysically secured unity of the divine Being. In a sense, our attribution of wisdom to the Son distinctively is guided by the Son’s relationship to the Father (as Image and He through which the Father creates) that is revealed to us in the Scriptural Revelation of salvation history. Thus, here again, what is given for faith, including what we cannot fully “say,” is definitive for our articulations and understandings. Interestingly, we find both what we cannot say (that the Father and Spirit are not wisdom), and what we should say: here, the faith that precedes understanding actually guides not simply the limits of our silence, but the shape of our positive speech. Our understanding, taking a cue from the centrality of divine unity, would seemingly suggest that we not speak as if the Son were “the wisdom and power of God,” because wisdom cannot be the Son’s alone: and yet we are compelled by what is revealed to speak as such.

Furthermore, Augustine’s concerns are real. For one to too closely tie the distinction between persons to the missions will not only mix God’s simplicity with composition; it also inevitably renders God’s intra-divine being subject to temporal history and creation. Too economic a theology, as some of the earlier Church Fathers drew dangerously close to, cannot secure the enduring value of relations in the being of God, because they wouldn’t theoretically stand in God apart from His act of creation. There is also the threat of tri-theism that results if God’s unity is somehow inordinately subject to the diversity encountered in the economy. Thus, in distancing himself from locating distinction according to the economy, and situating relationship in the intra-divine sphere, Augustine creates a distance that allows for the true and complex communion between the missions in salvation history and the intra-divine processions.

In the end then, Augustine provides us with an account of the Trinity that escapes the criticisms from an overly economic theology. In truth, Augustine’s treatment of divine unity and simplicity secures rather than undermines the Trinitarian diversity. And it is his unique hermeneutic of a faith that seeks and is complemented by understanding that strikes a subtle balance in his accounts of divine substance, the economy, and appropriations.

Footnotes

[1] Hill, p. 234

[2] Unlike Augustine, who saw hypostasis and substance as having the same essential meaning, both the Cappadocians and St. Thomas attempt to give an account of person/hypostasis that is not substantial yet maintains ontological value.

[3] Bk. VI, chp. 13, p.213; Bk. VII, chp. 3, p.227

[4] BkVII, chp. 3, p. 225: “God can be thought about more truly than he can be talked about, and he is more truly than he can be thought about.”

[5] Aquinas, St. Thomas. On The Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles Book 4: Salvation. Transl. O’Neil, Charles. New York: Hanover House, 1957: SCG IV, ch.42

Three What? Augustine and the Trinity (Part I)

I. Hermeneutic: Faith and Understanding

A number of contemporary theologians offer various critiques of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. An exemplar of such criticism is that of Catherine Lacugna in her God For Us. According to Lacugna, Augustine’s metaphysical speculation concerning the divine unity (found in books V-VII) creates an image of unity that is “prior to the plurality of persons” and makes ousia, rather than hypostasis (from the Cappadocian Fathers), the “highest ontological principle.” This ultimately renders the Trinity “impersonal.” Even if a sense of diversity[1] is upheld in God, Augustine’s ontological distinction between missions and processions “defunctionalizes” the Trinity by “minimizing the relationship between the divine persons and the economy of salvation.”[2] Appropriation and the specificity of a person’s mission become problematic, and in reality, she claims, Augustine is employing a “compensating strategy” [3] in a framework in which he’s lost the uniqueness and the link between the reality of the person and the revelation of that reality in a mission or appropriation. His vision boils down to one in which appropriations are “first” made of the single divine substance, and then arbitrarily passed on to the persons. Thus, Lacugna claims that Augustine’s ontological supremacy of divine unity over personality strips the Trinity of any meaning and function for us as Trinity, and its consequences stretch from metaphysical subordination in God to the impersonal nature of the economy of salvation.

What should one make of such criticism? Surely Lacugna’s concerns are important and affect the very life of a faith that encounters a God who is not merely a strict “oneness,” but is Trinity. Yet one must ask to what extent Augustine falls prey to such a troubled account of triunity. By examining Augustine’s De Trinitate, one can in fact find a Trinitarian theology that withstands such criticism: first, with regard to the context from which Augustine is working (in other words, where is Trinitarian discourse taking place?); second, by reading the metaphysics of books V-VII in that context; and lastly, by drawing out some of its fundamental implications for the doctrine of appropriations.

Implicit (and in certain ways, explicit) in Lacugna’s account is a distinction between the Eastern and Western approaches to the Trinity. The former, associated with the Cappadocians begins with the “threeness” and treats unity in light of a “personalism” that favors hypostasis (understood as individual person) as the governing ontological category. The Western approach in contrast is said to begin with unity of divine substance (ousia) and treat of “threeness” in light of the common nature. However, it is not altogether clear that such a distinction is operative, or at least definitive in such a way that the differences between east and west are greater than their similarities. For instance, Augustine borrows from the Cappadocians (Nazianzen in particular) the need to predicate names of God substantially rather than accidentally. Such a conclusion derived from the battle with Eunomian-Arian doctrine, strands of which Augustine was likely addressing in parts of the De Trinitate. Likewise, Augustine inherited not only the orthodox definition of triunity, but also apophatic concerns. And his “western” emphasis on the unity of God’s actions ad extra have undeniable similarities with Gregory of Nyssa’s account of divine action [4]. By deemphasizing the supposed chasm between Greek and Latin Trinitarian method, one can begin to put Lacugna’s critique into perspective.

But there seems to be evidence that the metaphysical work that Augustine does favors unity to such a degree that the distinctions in the Godhead are obscured: ousia is so much of a unity that it cannot maintain a “threefold” within the unity. Augustine’s metaphysical language does in fact stress the divine substance and how radically it equates the persons in terms of all attributes. However, while ousia may be Augustine’s “highest ontological principle” (indeed he does not even distinguish between the content of hypostasis and ousia as the Greeks do), one must admit that Augustine’s metaphysics is not the foundation or Archimedean point of his holistic account of the Trinity. His highest ontological principle is not in the end his highest principle as such. For Augustine, there is a donation of faith that precedes rational articulation, or understanding. The content of faith grounds and ultimately exceeds (beyond reduction) the rational articulation of that content. Augustine even explicitly speaks out against those who would worship reason and allow it to rule over their faith. In contrast, for him one must believe in order to understand: belief allows one to enter the milieu of understanding in the first place. But never in such a way that the deposit of faith is ever exhausted in the determinations of the understanding. What is given in faith for one to believe both allows one to understand and at the same time exceeds the ultimate reach of that understanding from the beginning. It remains irreducible even in what it gives to the understanding. Consistent with this are all of the apophatic elements of Augustine’s theology. Here, thus, no matter how central Augustine’s metaphysical conception of divine unity appears to be to his overall account of the nature of the Trinity, the content of faith that ever exceeds the understanding is still more guiding. For him, the locus and starting point of our belief is the Scriptural testament about God: from which he begins (starting in Book I) to articulate (according to reason) the unity of the persons in the Biblical theophanies. Thus, what is even more central to the belief that governs and grounds any attempt of understanding is the taxis of the economy; in which the specificity of the Divine persons (for instance, the Father is inextricably the Father of Jesus, not a divinely indeterminate father) shines forth. Augustine notes in book XV that all attributes of God that can be drawn from creation ultimately reduce to substantive terms, and thus ones common in the divine substance. Thus, by natural reason, unaided by the revelation in Scripture of the economy, one cannot cognitively reach the truly Trinitarian nature of God, existing in threeness (a position St. Thomas will later articulate). Ultimately then, Augustine seems to hold that taking a metaphysical foundation of divine unity as one’s starting point cannot truly reach the proper and orthodox account of the triunity that is the very subject of the De Trinitate. Rather, a true treatment of such divine threeness, one that is not merely a parody of the true God, can only be reached according to a faith that seeks understanding.

One must distinguish between the “motives” that determine one’s approach to and conclusions concerning the unity and diversity in God: in contrast to Augustine’s, the motive of a reason-loving approach, that sees the metaphysical emphasis on unity as foundational and ultimately determinative of what we believe, seemingly requires one to end with a sense of threeness that is either wholly undermined by unity or altogether restricted to the intra-divine sphere (and thus ineffective for the economy). This is, arguably, the motive of a Eunomian form of Arianism, which manipulates an emphasis of substantial predication in God in such a way that it concludes that the Son must be of a different substance from the Father (rather than the motive for a generically “western” or Augustinian preference for unity). One must recall that Augustine was in fact writing with a critical eye set on certain Arians of his day; and while it is clear that Augustine argues in the other direction, to the absolute unity in substance (though he dislikes the term “substance” used for God), it is not the case that he simply accepts the Eunomian’s sense of an “emphasis on substantial predication.” Rather, the centrality of unity in Augustine is not only used to reach an opposite conclusion, but it is of a wholly different kind. For the Bishop of Hippo, the role that metaphysical conclusions about unity play in his account is conditioned and limited by the more crucial centrality of a faith that precedes and grounds understanding (or metaphysical speculation).

Note here how Augustine seemingly shares the Cappadocians’ apophatic method, at least in a broad sense: what we don’t know and can’t say (but believe in) grounds and limits what we can say about substance and its conclusions for the threeness. Augustine, along with the Cappadocians, is working with an excessive understanding of mystery, such that it overwhelms rather than simply lacks, and that wonder is not thereby reduced to a problem that will in time be solved. This inheritance from the Cappadocians is perhaps the most important inheritance Augustine has in this work, or at least as important as the orthodox vision of triunity that he inherits as well.

Also, without the element of theoretical speculation that follows upon and clarifies faith, the testament given in faith becomes less than what it intends: the threeness that is given in Scriptural revelation is immensely vulnerable to various forms of subordinationism. Thus in order to reach a true, pure understanding of the diversity given to faith, the contemplation that follows upon faith is in fact necessary, and a reconciliation of the latter with the former is the final goal.

Further it is simply not the case that the persons lose their value for the economy; there is a strong sense in which the relations are not subject to (resistant to) determination by metaphysical reasoning (in a sense, they do not come under its gaze), which functions in the language of substantial terms; but it need not be for Augustine that the persons’ value for us within the economy derive from their justification in the eyes of that reasoning. The value of the taxis of the economy precedes the understanding we attempt to make of it and exceeds that understanding, and thus a true accomplishment of the understanding’s work cannot oppose and ultimately frame the value of what is first given to faith, simply because understanding is not on equal footing with faith. Rather, faith grounds our understanding. A conception such as the former would have to assume that the content of faith is merely a lack of what understanding eventually determines and exhausts; that understanding has the power and duty to “solve” the “problem” of what comes to us in the economy and in Scripture. Or in other words, that the Beatific Vision is accessible to us if we can only think hard enough. This view is fundamentally foreign to Augustine’s; thus, Augustine’s emphasis on metaphysical unity and the commonality between the persons, seen in this context, can never come to fully strip the economy of its Trinitarian value; rather, it only means to articulate an understanding of unity that is consistent with, in communion with, the sense of diversity that shines through in the economy. [5] How exactly this sense of communion and consistency takes shape will be discussed later on.

Thus one can see Augustine’s purpose as: 1) beginning with the mysterious “personalism,” the three, shining forth in the taxis of salvation history and thus the content of faith, and from this (faith grounding and inspiring understanding), articulating the sense of personal threeness in such a way that it is consistent with a radical substantive unity of being, which means metaphysical reflection or “understanding” compatible with and complementing the mysterious content of faith that remains ever irreducible; and 2) arguing that the one God, the unity, is a “threefold unity” in such a way that it is consistent with, expressive of, and ultimately conducive to the truth about the threeness that is given in faith. In this sense, Augustine can be seen as transcending any strict division between eastern and western approaches, and his hermeneutic of “faith seeking understanding” guides the proper thinking on the Trinity and safeguards his account from falling to criticisms that are more oriented toward heretical alternatives. One can then look, in both the metaphysical meditations and the doctrine of appropriations (specifically books V-VII) and find the same hermeneutic functioning throughout.

Footnotes

[1] Throughout the paper, I use diversity and distinction interchangeably: they are not meant to have varying definitions.

[2] Lacugna, Catherine Mowry. God For Us. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991. pg. 101

[3] Ibid, p. 100

[4] Augustine. The Trinity: De Trinitate. Trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. New York: New City Press, 1991: Bk. XV, chp.2, p.404: “No, he himself as these three, and he has them in such a way that he is them. But its being so with him comes to him from where he proceeds from”
[5] Bk. VI, chp. 2, p. 213: “For God is one, and yet He is three.”

Dissertation Discussion

As, I hope, most of our readers know, many of the bloggers here are at the beginning stages of their dissertation work. While I am still waiting for my dissertation to gain final approval of CUA, others are now beginning to write their proposals. I am going to be doing a considerable amount of work and study to prepare myself for my dissertation and aspects of what I am researching will suddenly appear on this blog (although I hope to address many other things than my dissertation as I write it). This will allow me to reflect upon it while I work through it, and hopefully get some feedback which will help me as I work on it.

I doubt that posting the current version of my proposal will cause any problems, and so I thought I would put it on here today for people to read, consider, and then hopefully give some response to it so that I can think about what people have to say as I write it.

Without further adieu, here it is:

Title of Proposed Research: Eternal Perdition and Human Freedom: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theology in Dialogue with the Mahāyāna Teaching of Asanga the Yogācārin


Statement of the Problem and Background:
The question of eternal perdition is an important question in a variety of theological traditions. With it come closely related questions: What causes one to be placed among the damned? Is it possible that no human will actually end up suffering eternal perdition? There are Christian theologians who advocate the hope for the salvation of all, even if they do not know that this outcome will actually happen. One can include within this group Hans Urs von Balthasar. While Balthasar hoped that everyone would be saved, he still believed that the possibility of perdition was real and must be examined. To him, it was of great importance that we consider the possibility that we will end up among the damned. Some of the important elements in his understanding of perdition are: 1) the fact that God justly condemns us due to our sins, 2) that in his love, God desires all of humanity to be saved 3) every human person will see the justice of God’s condemnation of sin at the time of his or her judgment, and 4) the final outcome of that judgment is unknown and will be based upon how we respond to a personal God’s loving offer of salvation. Balthasar’s unwillingness to affirm absolute and certain knowledge of universal salvation was based upon several theses about God and humanity, including his belief that theology must preserve both human freedom and God’s justice.

The question of eternal perdition also arose in Buddhist thought. There was a considerable amount of debate over the figure of the icchantika (someone who lacks the capacity for salvation) in the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Many Buddhists believed that if there were any icchantikas, this would establish some sort of eternal, unchanging self, that is, an atman. Asanga, who lived in the fourth century of our common era and was one of the founders of the Indian school of Yogācāra Buddhism, accepted the existence of the icchantikas in his writings and explained how one might become such. Because of his importance, Asanga’s explanation of the icchantikas represents a significant but often neglected possibility in Buddhist thought.

Buddhists and Christians have a significantly different understanding of what it means to be a person and to have free will. For both religious traditions, freedom is important. How does Asanga, with his understanding of freedom, establish the possibility of eternal perdition? In what ways does this lead to a position similar to Balthasar’s on eternal perdition? In what ways does it lead to a different understanding?

Purpose:
This dissertation will examine Balthasar’s understanding of perdition on its own terms and through the use of comparative theology. It seeks to understand whether there are issues underlying his beliefs which could be revealed by comparing it with the thought of Asanga.

Methodology:
It is envisaged that there will be four sections to the dissertation.
The first, the introduction, will explain the nature and scope of the inquiry. It will introduce the topic of eternal perdition in recent Christian theology. Second, there will be a discussion of the new discipline of comparative theology in systematic theology, explaining which of its approaches and methodologies will be used to examine perdition comparatively in this dissertation: A model will be established using the approaches of Neville, Clooney, Keenan, and Fredericks. The section will end with a consideration of the importance of Balthasar’s thought on perdition and why Asanga has been chosen to be the Buddhist thinker in this work of comparative theology.

A second section will examine Balthasar’s thought on eternal perdition, that is, what he thought it was and what he thought would cause someone to suffer such a fate. It will discern the reasoning and theological sources Balthasar used to define his position as well as provide an analysis as to how his ideas on eternal perdition developed. Of special interest in this examination will be what Balthasar says about a person’s free will and how this relates to his ideas about eternal perdition. Among the works which will be examined in surveying the development of his thought will be the Apokalypse der deutschen Seele, Theologie der drei Tage and Theodramatik.

A third section will examine Asanga’s understanding of eternal perdition, i.e., what he thought it was and what he thought would cause someone to suffer such a fate. Because the historical development of Asanga’s thought cannot be fully discerned (we have very little reliable biographical information about him), what will be most important here will be the sources and reasoning he used to define his position. Of special interest in this examination will be what Asanga says about a person’s free will and how this relates to his ideas about eternal perdition. Among the works of Asanga which will be examined are his Abhidharmasamuccaya, Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra and Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, together with their commentarial tradition and related texts in Yogācāra Buddhism.

The fourth section will undertake a comparative analysis of the thought of Balthasar and Asanga on eternal perdition. Employing the comparative method elaborated in section one, this analysis will compare and contrast what Balthasar and Asanga say about what a person is, about that person’s free will, and about how that free will is capable of being employed in a way that could lead to eternal perdition. Finally, it will summarize what the convergences and divergences of Balthasar’s thought with that of Asanga tell us about the former’s position on perdition.

Contribution and Originality:
While there is some extant theological literature in which Balthasar’s theology is brought into conversation with Eastern religions, so far no attention has been paid to the question of eternal perdition. By examining the topic of perdition in a comparative manner, this dissertation will provide a new way to examine this aspect of Balthasar’s eschatology, especially in relation to his understanding of what a person is and the pivotal role that freedom plays in determining that person’s eternal fate

Personal Library

Today, I am going to write a post which, for me, is quite unusual. I am going to write about my personal library, the program I currently use to catalog them, and suggest others to do something similar. But things will return to normal here soon.

On the side of the blog, if you have been astute, you will note I've added a link to a website where I list the books which are contained within my personal collection of books. It's not complete, and it might never be. I am constantly buying new books and I have stragglers which I keep forgetting to add. However, it is a fair representation of what I read. Currently (as of June 11, 2007), the domain where I placed my records has down, due to hackers attacking it. If it does not come back up, I will find a new place to host my records.

I would like to suggest anyone who collects books such as I to find a program like the one I use (Book Collector) to record what it is they own. The program I use is very easy to use, when adding to the books within your library, all you have to do is input either the ISBN, the author, or the title of the books, and it will search for the book and will fill out much of the data for you. I know many use Library Thing and it is another option for people interested in cataloging their books, though it does not record things the same way, and it does not give you all the options of Book Collector. By using it, I found out how much my book collection is worth. I was shocked when it came to the total -- many of the books I own have gone up drastically in price, and not down as one would expect with used books!

This is also a good way to keep track of what you own if you want to insure your book collection. More importantly, it can allow others to know what it is you own, and if they take the time, it can tell them something about you and your interests (as long as they don't believe all the books you own indicates your approval or agreement with what is inside them!). Try it out, and if the link works, look at the books I own. Some might surprise you, some might even shock you, but if so, just ask and I might be able to explain why they are there!

Tolkien on Scandal in the Church

"'Scandal' at most is an occassion of temptation -- as indecency is to lust, which it does not make about arouses. It is convenient because it turns our eyes away from ourselves and our faults to find a scape-goat. But the act of will of faith is not a single moment of final decision: it is a permanent indefinitely repeated act > state which must go on -- so we pray for 'final perseverance.' The temptation to 'unbelief' (which really means rejection of Our Lord and His claims) is always there within us. Part of us longs to find an excuse for it outside us. The stronger the inner temptation the more readily and severely shall we be 'scandalized' by others. I think I am as sensitive as you (or any other Christian) to the 'scandals', both of clergy and laity. I have suffered grievously in my life from stupid, tired, dimmed, and even bad priests; but I now know enough about myself to be aware that I should not leave the Church (which for some would mean leaving the allegiance of Our Lord) for any such reason: I should leave because I did not believe, and should not believe any more, even if I had never met any one in orders who was not both wise and saintly."

--- Letter 250, to Michael Tolkien. In The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. ed. Humphrey Carpenter (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981).